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Aim
We aim to further explain what makes an influential CEO.
This study examines the effects of CEO familial status on
corporate policy in family firms in dimensions including, but
not limited to, profitability, value, overhead, and investment.
Introduction
There is a great deal of research on CEO characteristics
that affect their firms. Previous research has shown that
personal CEO characteristics affect corporate policy.
The relationship between corporate policy and CEO
characteristics is important because it provides insight to
future firm performance and the efficient allocation of
scarce capital in our economy to their most productive
outlets. Prior research has suggested that:
• When CEOs achieves “superstar” status, they
typically underperform compared to their previous
performance and compared to their non-superstar
counterparts; however, their compensation is higher and
spending more time on work outside their firms
[Malmendier and Tate (2009)].
• Marital status influences risk-taking in CEOs which
affects investment and compensation [Yore and Nicolosi
(2014)].
In addition to looking at the relationship between CEO
parental status and corporate policy, we add in the
effects of founder CEOs and family firm CEOs. This is
important because there is an long-term view that family
firms have as compared to their professionally managed
counterparts. Prior research has suggested that
• On average, family firms outperform their non-family
counterparts due to increased ownership stakes and a
commitment to the future of the firm [Anderson and Reeb
(2003)].
• Concentrated family ownership creates the potential
for rent extraction and a focus on nonpecuniary benefits
rather than profitable investments [Demsetz (1983)].
• When family firms are led by non-founder CEOs, rent
extraction is evident [ Villalonga and Amit (2005)].
Analysis
We use the ExecuComp database, which provides information on the S&P 1500
firms. We have 14,555 firm-year-observations of 2,563 unique CEOs from 1,752
unique firms from 1992 to 2012.
We then use the websites Marquis Who’s Who and the Notable Names Database to
find information about CEO’s and their offspring. We look for the number of children,
the gender of those children, their birth dates, and any other information that is
available.
Using ordinary least squares regression on this data, we regress several dependent
variables on our variables of interest. Our variables of interest are CEO parental
status and CEO founder or founder family member status.
Profitability = β0 + β1 Children + β2 Founder + β3 Children x Founder + β4 Controls + ε
Firm Value = β0 + β1 Children + β2 Founder + β3 Children x Founder + β4 Controls + ε
Overhead = β0 + β1 Children + β2 Founder + β3 Children x Founder + β4 Controls + ε
R&D = β0 + β1 Children + β2 Founder + β3 Children x Founder + β4 Controls + ε
.
Motivation
In our previous research, we find that parental CEOs lead more profitable firms,
particularly at family-owned companies. Consistent with previous research, family
firms also outperform. However, the data shows that family firms outperform only
when the CEO has a child.
We also find that CEOs with children lead firms with higher valuations, but the effect
is driven entirely by family firms. Controlling for child status, we no longer
observe the founder premium documented in the literature.
Additionally, firms with children spend less on overhead and more on R&D and
advertising. These results are likely due to founder and family CEOs having a desire
to invest in the future of the firm because they are developing a legacy for their
children
Methods
Again using the ExecuComp database, we have 39,627 firm-year observations from
1992 to 2012 of all the firms that were ever in the S&P 1500 during that time frame.
We gather information from corporate proxy statements regarding family and founder
ownership, blockholders, top management team and board members, generation,
and several other variables. Once all the data is collected, we will conduct a
regression and analyze the results.
Tables
Direction of Future Research
We are currently two years into this research project. Most of this time has been
spent reading relevant literature and collecting data. The rest of the project duration
will be spent finishing the data collection and analysing the data set. We plan to re-
examine the variables we previously looked at, as well as expand our results. Some
ideas of interest include generational effects and ownership level. We estimate that
we are two-thirds of the way to project completion.
Firm Value
Children 0.018 0.018 0.015 0.071 0.072 0.027
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.41)
Family Firm 0.005 0.002 0.049 -0.007
(0.01) (0.43) (0.01) (0.77)
Family Firm x Children 0.006 0.118
(0.04) (0.00)
Profitability
Profitability Contro ls: Firm Size, Cash to Assets, Stock Return, M arket-to-Book, Firm Age, High Tech Firm,
CEO marriage, CEO divorce, CEO Ownership, CEO Tenure, CEO Age, industry and year fixed effects
Firm Value Contro ls: Firm Size, Cash to Assets, Stock Return, M arket-to-Book, Firm Age, High Tech Firm,
CEO marriage, CEO divorce, CEO Ownership, CEO Tenure, CEO Age, industry and year fixed effects
Children -0.006 -0.006 -0.008 0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.09) (0.09) (0.53)
Family Firm 0.006 0.004 -0.003 -0.005
(0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00)
Family Firm x Children 0.004 0.004
(0.17) (0.02)
Overhead R&D
R&D Contro ls: Firm Size, Cash to Assets, Stock Return, M arket-to-Book, Firm Age, High Tech Firm, CEO
marriage, CEO divorce, CEO Ownership, CEO Tenure, CEO Age, industry and year fixed effects
Overhead Contro ls: Firm Size, Cash to Assets, Stock Return, M arket-to-Book, Firm Age, High Tech Firm,
CEO marriage, CEO divorce, CEO Ownership, CEO Tenure, CEO Age, industry and year fixed effect
Mean 6.72% Std Deviation 25.05% Mean 7.93% Std Deviation 27.03%
Variance 6.27% Variance 7.31%
Mean 13.66% Std Deviation 34.36% Mean 71.70% Std Deviation 45.07%
Variance 11.80% Variance 20.32%
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